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Abstract 
The introduction of performance-related pay and performance management schemes in the maintained, state, 
school sector represents a considerable change in the school management system. This paper combines the 
results of opinion surveys of classroom and head teachers with Department for Education and Skills school 
performance data to consider the operation and impact of the new system in England since 2000. We find that 
teachers’ response to the new system closely resembles that of other groups of public service workers to similar 
schemes. In particular, teachers appear not to be greatly motivated by the financial-incentive element of the 
system. However, the goal-setting and appraisal aspect of the system is steadily establishing itself in schools, 
and seems to be giving rise to a better alignment of teacher and school objectives and with those of national-
level policy objectives. We present tentative evidence that improvements in goal setting within schools are 
positively related to rising pupil academic performance. 
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11. Introduction 
 
The introduction of performance management for classroom teachers in England and Wales from 
the autumn of 2000 has been a reform with great ambitions. It represents a fundamental departure 
from long-established methods of managing schools: it introduced a specific focus on the effects of 
teacher performance on outcomes for their students; and it tied this to ways in which they can be 
measured, and linked to the targets set for schools. Coming after local management for schools and 
the establishment of school performance targets and league tables, in principle, performance 
management for teachers provides the keystone for school management reforms. Schools have 
greater autonomy to manage their budgets, and the performance league tables and parental choice 
have created a quasi-market in which schools operate with very real sanctions if they fail to attract 
pupils. Now performance management promises to give head teachers a mechanism for linking 
individual teachers’ objectives in the classroom with those of their schools. 
 
Although novel for schools, performance pay and performance management have been widely 
introduced into the British public services since the late 1980s, and indeed, have become quite 
widespread in the public services of many OECD countries (OECD, 2005). However, this study of 
schools advances the analysis of such schemes in an important way by scrutinizing the ways in 
which local management implements and operates a common national scheme across a large 
number of different local units. It can therefore tackle a key question that the government’s 
Makinson Report (2000) raised but could not answer directly: to what extent are management 
failures in goal setting and appraisal the cause of the widespread employee disenchantment with the 
operation of public service performance pay schemes, which occurs despite the general acceptance 
of the principle of linking pay to performance? Furthermore, schools offer a propitious environment 
for studying the effects of differences in the way performance management is operated because of 
the large number of local units, each with its own management team, and a good deal of local 
autonomy. 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the success of the new system of performance pay and 
management in schools introduced in 2000, focusing on the hitherto neglected issue of the 
articulation between goal setting at the level of individual employees and that for organisations. Its 
scope is limited to England, as the scheme has been implemented with sufficient difference in 
Wales to rule out direct comparison between schools from differing sides of the border. How well 
the new pay system and performance management have worked is considered from four main 
angles: 
 
2• improved motivation; 
• improved goal setting; 
• as a stimulus to improve school management; and 
• as a contributor to improved educational outcomes. 
 
The empirical focus of this study is on schools and on teachers. Nevertheless, a comparison of the 
present study’s results with those for a wider range of public services reported in Marsden (2004), 
including the civil service and health, confirms that similar motivational processes and concerns 
about management fair dealing are at work. 
 
The paper starts with an outline of the new pay and performance management system for primary 
and secondary school teachers in England and Wales introduced in the autumn of 2000. It then 
outlines the key hypotheses to be investigated, and explains the special nature of the panel survey of 
schools and of teachers, before presenting key results. 
 
 
2. The New Teachers’ Pay and Performance Management System 
 
In December 1998, the government published its green paper ‘Teachers: meeting the challenge of 
change’ (Cm 4164). In exchange for a substantial pay increase, which reversed several years of 
declining relative pay, the government proposed a new pay system designed to reward teachers for 
excellence in the classroom. In essence, the new scheme proposed to extend the old pay scale by 
adding a new Upper Pay Scale (UPS) lifting the pay ceiling for experienced teachers, and giving 
new entrants to the profession a better long term salary profile. The pay rise would take teachers at 
the top of the old pay scale from about £24k to £26k with the opportunity to rise to £30k at a time 
when average white collar full-time annual earnings stood at a little over £25k. 
 
In exchange, teachers were expected to accept a new system of performance management. In 
summary, this involved annual performance reviews for all teachers, and the introduction of 
‘Threshold Assessment’ at the top of the old scale. The latter is based on an assessment of the 
teacher’s general professional competence, and included two important principles: some part of the 
assessment should be related to pupil progress, and the upper pay scale should be ‘tapered’ with 
increasingly demanding levels of performance required for further progression. For teachers who 
pass the Threshold, progression up the new Upper Pay Scale depends upon performance. 
 
3The new scheme was met with widespread hostility from both classroom and head teachers and 
their respective associations. There was also much academic scepticism as to whether PM was 
appropriate and could be made to work in schools. Two leading academic economists published 
critiques of the new scheme and the idea of linking pay to performance in schools (Richardson, 
1999; Dolton et al, 2003). 
 
After a legal challenge mounted by the National Union of Teachers, the new scheme was 
implemented in the autumn of 2000, with teachers getting the results of the first wave of threshold 
applications in the spring of 2001, bringing many onto the first step of the new Upper Pay Scale 
(UPS1) from autumn 2001. As the initial pass rate for the Threshold assessment was very high, over 
95% based on an application rate of 80% of those eligible, with a similar figure for the second wave 
in 2002, it has been debated whether there is any practical performance element.1 Several of the 
unions argue that effectively it has become like a ‘driving test’, and claim some credit for 
neutralising the scheme. On the other side, at least one union maintains that it is still a form of 
payment by results, and the DfES stresses the self-selection element that can apply when teachers 
and their heads decide whether or not to apply. Most importantly, our own survey, to be described 
shortly, shows that a similar ambivalence exists in the minds of classroom teachers. 
 
 
3. Key Hypotheses 
 
There has been a considerable amount of research on incentive pay, although a great deal of this has 
focused on categories of employees whose output is clearly defined. Lazear’s (1996) often cited 
study of incentive pay for windscreen replacement staff is a good example, which showed that 
productivity rose with the introduction of output-based pay as a result of improved incentives and 
improved selection. Professional sports, sales staff, and chief executives have all been subject of 
numerous studies, many of which appear to indicate positive results for performance incentives of 
one kind or another (Prendergast, 1999). Public service workers form a stark contrast with these 
groups, as it is difficult to find clear and uncontentious measures of their performance. This is partly 
because of the widespread use of team work for core activities, and partly because of multiple 
objectives and an important qualitative component of the services provided. Thus, in the light of 
these observations, Makinson’s conclusion that the operation of performance pay had been 
especially problematic in the public services is hardly a surprise. 
 
Nevertheless, the definition and measurement of public service objectives and targets has 
progressed a great deal since the mid-1980s, as has the reorganisation of public service provision 
4into specialist agencies capable of bearing operational targets. Expectancy theory and goal setting 
theory (reviewed respectively in Furham, 1998, and in Locke and Latham, 2002) provide the 
framework for examining incentives and appraisal at the level of individual employees. The former 
predicts that employees will be motivated by rewards to perform if they value the rewards, they are 
in a position to raise their performance, and they believe that management will deliver. The latter 
predicts that employees’ performance will be better the more clearly their goals are set, and the 
greater their involvement and influence in that process. This encourages information exchange, and 
helps to foster employee commitment to the agreed goals. Contract and justice theories also predict 
that performance is likely to follow rewards if employees believe their management respects a 
freely agreed contract, and management behaviour is considered to be fair (Malcomson, 1997; 
Rousseau, 1995). 
 
Existing theory is much less developed when it comes to the link between individual-level 
motivation to perform and goal setting on the one hand, and organisation-level targets on the other. 
This link is especially important in many public services because of the difficulty of defining 
performance effectively at the micro level such that it contributes to organisational performance. 
The predominant solution that has emerged in recent years has been to use employee goal setting 
and appraisal by line managers as the instrument for the micro-level goals. However, unless this 
process is informed by organisational goals, there is little reason to expect an aggregate 
improvement in organisational performance. In addition, it is well-known that there is an element of 
negotiation in setting and appraising employee goals, as rank and file employees can withdraw 
cooperation from line managers who are felt to behave in an unfair or overbearing manner. Thus, 
there is pressure to be lenient in both setting goals and appraising performance. Organisational-level 
targets provide a means of informing employee-level goal setting and also provide a discipline 
potentially restricting line manager indulgency. 
 
Something like this appears to have occurred in the Inland Revenue where performance 
management occasioned a renegotiation of performance norms (Marsden, 2004). There, line 
managers faced pressures from their colleagues to be lenient with appraisals and indulgent with the 
awarding of performance pay. However, the performance targets for their offices meant that top 
management could sanction such leniency once it became clear that there was a discrepancy 
between the level of performance awards and how well individual offices met their targets. In that 
case, performance management appears to have been the occasion for a renegotiation of staff 
performance norms, with the appraisal process providing management with the means to 
communicate the new norms with each employee individually. However, this remains very much an 
inference from somewhat aggregated data, whereas in the case of schools, the survey instrument 
5used enables us to observe directly the relationship between the way PM is implemented in schools 
and classroom teacher responses. 
 
Management within the school system is not as hierarchical as this line of reasoning suggests. Most 
head teachers are not closely monitored by higher levels of management. Nevertheless, the ‘quasi 
market’ in which schools now operate potentially creates a discipline on schools and their 
management teams to address issues of internal performance (Glennerster, 2002). League tables of 
school performance, and Ofsted reports, inform parental choice. They are freely available for 
inspection on-line, and their details are often published in local newspapers. Thus state schools have 
to compete for pupils. Failing schools may well be closed down. 
 
School management teams have a degree of choice in how they respond to these pressures. Thus we 
distinguish between two strategies that management may follow: a ‘reformer’ strategy and a ‘fire-
fighter’ strategy.2 According to the former, schools will use the new performance pay and 
performance management in order to achieve ‘joined-up’ targets in their schools. They will use the 
opportunities for discussing classroom teachers’ objectives and appraising their achievement as an 
opportunity to focus these on the school’s objectives, as for example set out in the School 
Improvement Plan. To assist schools in thir process, the DfES gave numerous mini case studies 
showing how the performance review could be used to link teachers’ objectives to those of their 
schools, for example, by addressing the performance of a particular group of pupils in a given year. 
Alternatively, schools may treat the new system as a means of obtaining extra government money to 
fund better salaries for classroom teachers. This could be motivated by concerns about staff 
recruitment and retention, or it could be improve the atmosphere in the school – showing the head is 
on the side of her teachers. 
 
These two strategies are not mutually exclusive because the ‘reformer’ strategy could easily be 
undermined by high rates of staff turnover.  But, the emphasis is different, and one would expect the 
former to be more likely to lead to improved school performance in relation to its own targets. 
However, one might also expect more schools to move to the ‘reformer’ strategy once they have 
secured the pay increase for their staff, and tackled their retention problems. The difference between 
the two strategies should show up in the degree to which goal setting for class teachers reflects the 
goals of the school, and how well they are ‘joined up’.  
 
 
64. The Nature of the Survey 
 
The empirical basis of this study is a panel questionnaire survey of classroom and head teachers and 
their schools conducted at intervals between 2000 and 2004. It has been carried out in close 
consultation with the teachers’ unions and professional organisations and the DfES. Nevertheless, it 
is an independent study. The panel, based on a random sample of primary and secondary schools in 
England and Wales, has now completed three waves: the first in February-March 2000, before the 
new scheme was implemented (see Marsden, 2000); the second in May-June 2001, after the results 
of the first round of the new system were known; and the third in May-June 2004, after the results 
of the third round of the system. For classroom teachers, the questionnaire probes their attitudes to 
and their experiences with performance management, and seeks to measure aspects of their work 
patterns and priorities alongside other variables such as their degree of organisational commitment 
and their assessment of the working atmosphere in their schools. For head teachers, it asks also 
about the operation of performance management in their schools, and whether they believe it has 
assisted them in their management duties. In addition to the ‘before and after’ element of the panel, 
it is possible to link replies from classroom teachers with those of their head teachers, and with 
other information on their schools concerning the impact of performance management on work 
patterns, a set of school management practices, and some educational outcomes. Initially, the panel 
included replies from about 4,000 teachers and about 1,000 heads. Accounting for sample attrition, 
it is possible to link replies from about 1,000 teachers and about 300 heads over time through the 
panel. We conducted a number of checks to see whether the panel results reported here differ 
statistically significantly from the simple cross-section results for each wave, and found that on the 
whole they do not. 
 
Unlike previous UK public service studies, which relied on cross-sectional evidence, and almost 
entirely on self-reported information, this study has been designed to enable the researchers to track 
the same teachers and their schools over time, and to link the replies of class and head teachers in 
the same schools with DfES data on school performance. We have therefore a number of 
independent replies from each school and so substantially avoid the problems of common method 
variance and self-reporting that limit interpretation of standard cross-sectional attitude surveys of 
performance pay. A considerable methodological advantage enjoyed by this study is that the sheer 
number of schools and the independence of their management means that we can observe changes 
in individual management units much more precisely than was ever possible in large government 
departments or even hospitals. The study also benefits from the fact that a common overall 
performance pay and performance management scheme was applied to all schools, while giving 
local school management a degree of autonomy as to how the scheme is operated. 
75. Results 
 
In presenting the results, we start by summarising some of the general reactions of class and head 
teachers to the new system, and then explore the operation of performance management in different 
schools. We do so by seeing whether head teachers’ assessments are reflected in the experience of 
other members of the leadership group, such as department heads, and in that of classroom teachers. 
The convergence of these reports in a set of cases confirms that in a substantial and growing 
minority of schools all three groups independently report improvements in the setting of goals and 
priorities. In schools where this happens, there is also evidence of a stronger focus on pupil 
attainments as an objective, and of greater attention to learning about educational practices from 
schools that are seen to perform well in the DfES performance league tables. We also investigate 
whether these findings are reflected in improvements in the academic performance of their pupils. 
However, this last analysis is somewhat tentative owing to the many factors that affect pupil 
performance, such as their socio-economic background. 
 
5.1 An overview of the survey replies 
 
As a group, teachers have been more sceptical of the principle of linking pay to performance and its 
feasibility in their area of work than other public service employees (see Marsden and French, 
1998). This is reflected in the first wave responses of both classroom and head teachers in 2000 (see 
Tables 1 and 2 below). A significant factor in this is that it is widely believed that teaching is a 
collective activity, and therefore it is not appropriate to seek to relate pupils’ progress to the work of 
any one individual teacher. Initially, the views of heads and class teachers were very similar, with 
80-90% holding this view, one supported by a number of the academic critiques of the new scheme 
(Richardson, 1999; Dolton et al, 2003). 
 
However, teachers share many other perceptions of performance pay with other groups of public 
employees. As with the surveys of civil servants and hospital employees, the financial incentive of 
PRP is reported to play a rather small part for the great majority. In common with other public 
employees, they entered into the new scheme very apprehensive about how it would operate in 
practice. They were suspicious of both line and central management: line managers would reward 
their favourites, and budgetary restrictions would limit the distribution of performance ratings 
(Table 1). The authors also found that the same factors that determined perceptions of motivation 
and divisiveness among other public employees were also influential among teachers (see Marsden 
and Belfield, 2005). A high-quality appraisal and goal-setting process boosted the perceived 
8incentive, and its lack raised perceived divisiveness. Further, a sense of organisational commitment 
enhanced perceptions of incentive, and muted those of divisiveness. Perceptions that there was little 
scope to raise performance also undermined confidence in performance management. Thus 
teachers’ reactions may differ in degree when compared with other groups, but there is no 
indication that they are fundamentally different. 
 
What is striking about the changes over time among both classroom and head teachers, is the 
gradual decline of opposition to key aspects performance management: a gradual rise in acceptance 
of the principle, growing confidence in the way it is operated in their schools, notably as concerns 
favouritism and improved goal setting. Nevertheless, teachers remain very sensitive to any threat to 
continued DfES funding of performance management pay increases, and any suggestion that they 
should be made dependent on already stretched school budgets. This can be seen in Table 1, where 
initially fears that quota restrictions would apply dropped (to 23% after the first wave), but rose 
again steeply by the third wave, following proposals by the DfES to cease central funding of 
performance increments. In the event, it decided to continue the practice. 
 
9Table 1. Classroom teachers’ judgements of Performance Management: before and after 
implementation (Balanced panel results) 
 
Classroom Teachers Disagree Neutral/  
don’t know 
Agree 
The principle of relating teachers' pay to  
performance is a good one. 
   
Wave 1 65 13 22 
Wave 2 55 16 29 
Wave 3 44 18 39 
Salary levels > Threshold too low to make me 
want to work harder 
   
1 15 50 35 
2 23 39 38 
3 27 38 36 
Managers will reward favourites    
1 16 28 55 
2 22 36 42 
3 48 32 20 
Quota/inadequate funding    
1 4 13 83 
2 43 34 23 
3 4 17 79 
Targets set more clearly    
2 30 31 40 
3 23 26 51 
More aware of school’s targets in the  
School Improvement Plan 
   
2 47 26 28 
3 41 23 36 
Hard to relate the work done in schools to 
 individual performance 
   
1 4 6 90 
2 8 7 84 
3 14 10 76 
Note: Results are based on the balanced panel, that is those replying in each of the three waves. The number of 
responses that could be linked across all three waves was around 760 unweighted observations. This compares with A 
total response at each wave was: wave 1: 4369, wave 2: 1876, and wave 3: 1,114 teachers. The results of the balanced 
panel differ only slightly from those of the three cross-sections. Changes between the waves were all statistically 
significant at the 1% level (chi2).  Scores in the table are weighted by sample fractions (smplwt). Variable names: 
ppgdprin, critcash, ppblueye, ppquota, pptarget, ppmeawar, ppmeasur. 
 
Thus, a first view of the survey results is that the system has had a mildly positive effect in 
promoting more effective coordination of priorities in schools, especially over time, but, for most 
teachers, it does not provide a financial incentive. This latter observation is all the more striking 
given the potential size of the cumulative pay increase over several years offered under the new 
system, and the high rates of success in passing the Threshold and moving up the initial steps of 
UPS. However, it is consistent with the findings of other research on teachers, which finds that they 
see pay as a source of dissatisfaction, but not as a primary source of their motivation, which lies in 
other aspects of their work (eg. Vaarlem et al, 1992).3 
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Table 2. Head teachers’ judgements of Performance Management: before and after 
implementation (Balanced panel) 
 
Head Teachers disagree neutral agree 
Principle of relating teachers' pay to performance 
 is good.  
   
Wave 1 46 17 37 
Wave 2 42 18 40 
Wave 3 27 11 62 
Hard to relate work to individual performance     
1 9 9 82 
2 20 14 67 
3 39 18 43 
 
EFFECTS OF THE NEW SYSTEM 
 
   
Targets set more clearly, as in school  
development plan  
   
1 25 21 53 
2 10 7 83 
3 6 11 83 
Gives teachers greater incentive to focus 
 on pupil attainments  
   
 37 21 42 
 37 21 42 
 30 22 48 
Unfair because too few teachers have autonomy 
 to change work practice  
   
1 39 27 33 
2 45 29 27 
3 70 21 9 
PR assists in dealing with poor performance     
1 27 19 54 
2 41 15 44 
3 37 22 41 
Link with pay will make people take appraisal  
more seriously  
   
1 30 11 60 
2 34 14 52 
3 30 12 57 
Note: the balanced panel consists of about 105 head teachers (175 unweighted observations), compared with the cross-
section sample numbers of 479, 232, and 164, or unweighted numbers of 479, 420 and 293. The figures in Table 2 
differ only slightly from those of the three cross-section samples.  Changes between waves highly significant (chi2 
probability <1%) except for pupil attainments, poor performance and take appraisal more seriously, which were not 
statistically significant. Weighted results using smplwt, by sample fractions. 
*SIP: School Improvement Plan. Variables used: ppgdprin,ppmeasur, pptarget, tcattain, themcant, pppoorwk, ppserius. 
 
Behind the general picture, one might expect there to be considerable variation between schools 
given the relatively large degree of autonomy their management teams enjoy within the frameworks 
established by the DfES and their local education authorities. The information we have from league 
tables about the range of academic performance of individual schools, and of the conditions in 
which they operate, give good reason to expect considerable variation in the way that performance 
management has been implemented. The next section explores this dimension. 
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5.2 Improvements in school management 
 
To address how far PM has changed school management, we examine head teacher assessments of 
how far PM has helped them address issues of teacher performance and how far it has led to 
improved goal setting. The heads’ questionnaire measured two ways in which this might occur: 
improvements in goal setting and the linking of individual teacher objectives to school targets; and 
attempts to provide support to teachers in order to assist their performance. 
 
Measures of improved goal setting are explored in Table 3. The first two variables show that, by the 
third wave, a majority of teachers considered that performance management made teachers more 
aware of the school’s objectives, and helped them prioritise their work better. An important link, 
particularly in larger schools, would be the quality of work by middle management team or 
leadership group. Between 55% and 60% of heads considered this to be important in their schools, 
although the increase between the two waves was small. As a control, we also ask whether 
performance management had caused the quantity of work by teachers to increase, and it is clear 
that a declining minority of heads thought this to be a key element of performance management. 
 
In the view of many heads, an important feature of PM is its use as a means of identifying ways 
schools can support their teachers (Table 4). The questions that comprise the table reflect the factors 
identified by heads in the first wave as potential causes of variations in the effectiveness of 
experienced teachers in their schools. Mostly, these factors are of kinds that could be addressed by 
the school’s management team, for example through training or other forms of support. Thus, we 
asked heads whether PM had enabled them to address some of these problem factors. By wave 3, 
benefits were identified in a substantial minority of cases, between 20 and 35%, the most important 
being assistance in identifying teachers’ professional development needs, and workload problems,  
There was a notable increase between the second and third waves for some issues. By 2004, 35% of 
heads in the balanced panel reported that PM had helped them identify and assist teachers whose 
workload problems that might inhibit their performance. 
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Table 3. Contribution of performance management to improved goal setting in schools: Head 
teacher views. 
 
Performance management has: Agree % 
Balanced 
panel 
made more teachers aware of the school’s objectives
 in the School Improvement Plan  W2 41 
 W3 57** 
  
made teachers think more systematically about their 
work priorities  W2 39 
 W3 54* 
  
increased the importance of good middle  
management.  W2 55 
 W3 60 
  
caused increase the quantity of work teachers do.  W2 17 
 W3 13** 
Note: sample numbers in the balanced panel are 104, and in the cross section about 420 and 290 respectively in waves 2 
and 3. Changes between waves are statistically significant (Chi2 prob <=1%) for  questions 1 and 4, significant at the 
5% level for priorities, and not significant for middle management. Similar differences between the waves are shown in 
the comparison of cross-section data, but significance levels are higher, except for middle management owing to the 
larger number of observations. Statistical significance of change between Waves 1 and 2: ** 1%; * 5%.  Weighted 
results using smplwt. Variables used: themgoal, themprios, themmidl, themquan. 
 
Table 4. Performance management as a means of support for teachers: Head teacher views 
 
PM has helped the school assist those teachers:  Agree % balanced panel Agree % cross-section
- with difficult or inappropriate workloads.  W2 11 14 
 W3 35** 29** 
    
- whose professional development needs  
are greatest  W2 37 33 
 W3 36 41** 
    
- whose morale was low  W2 18 17 
 W3 23 25 
    
- who had difficulty motivating their pupils.  W2 12 10 
 W3 21+ 17 
Weighted with smplwt. Number of observations: balanced panel 103, and in the cross section, wave 2 c. 415, and wave 
3, c. 290. Chi2 tests of statistical significance had the following levels of significance: for the balanced panel they were  
respectively for each question: 0.4 , 0.2, 0.08, and 0.003; and for the cross section comparisons: 0.004, 0.146, 0.229, 
and 0.003. ** change significant at 1% level, + at 10% level. Variables used: pmaidwkl, pmaidskl, pmaidmle, 
pmaidmtv. 
 
A critical question is whether these head teacher views are simply personal beliefs, or whether they 
reflect underlying changes in their schools. To explore this question, we must compare head teacher 
reports with those of other members of the leadership group, and with those of classroom teachers 
more generally. To simplify the analysis, we use factor analysis to compute an index that measures 
the degree to which head teachers consider PM to have improved goal setting in their schools, and 
we then compare this with the replies of the leadership group and classroom teachers. 
13
 
In Table 5, we show the index of head teacher judgements concerning the beneficial effects of PM 
on goal setting in their schools in relation to those of teachers in the leadership group. The index has 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity, so that a positive figure indicates that head 
teachers identify positive benefits, and vice versa. The standard deviation of unity means that we 
can expect about one sixth of heads to have a score greater than one, and one sixth, a score less than 
minus one. The figure of 0.402 in the top left-hand corner of Table 5 shows that in schools where 
the leadership group agree strongly that PM makes class teachers more aware of the school’s 
objectives, head teachers believe PM has improved the effectiveness of goal setting. Likewise, 
where the leadership group disagree strongly, so do heads (score –0.359). A similar correspondence 
can be observed for leadership group replies to questions about their colleagues’ priorities, and the 
importance of good quality middle management. 
 
Table 5. Comparing the effects of PM as seen by head teachers and the leadership group in 
their school. 
 
Leadership group 
response (excl head): 
Makes class teachers more 
aware of school targets 
 
(themgoal) 
Promotes better work 
priorities among class 
teachers 
 
(thempriors) 
increases importance of 
good middle-mgt 
(themmidl) 
Agree strongly .402 .300 .181 
Agree .111 .202 .188 
Disagree .105 .127 .095 
Disagree strongly -.359 -.302 -.217 
    
Neutral/no view .210 .054 .131 
Factor scores for better goal setting as judged by head teachers. Cells show factor scores for head teacher replies in 
these schools, waves 2 and 3 combined. Mean zero, standard deviation of unity. 
 
 
Among classroom teachers, the same correspondence between their heads’ assessment of improved 
goal setting and their own experience of PM can be observed as for the leadership group, albeit a 
little less pronounced (Table 6). Thus, it seems that the heads’ judgement of the effects of PM on 
goal setting are indeed reflected in the experience of the leadership group and classroom teachers in 
a good many schools. The analysis is shown separately for all classroom teachers, including those 
in the leadership group in the upper panel, and classroom teachers excluding those in the leadership 
group in the lower panel. The latter figures although ‘cleaner’ are based on a smaller sample. As 
can be seen, the relationship between head and classteacher judgements of goal setting is similar in 
both cases. 
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Table 6. Comparing the effects of PM as seen by head teachers and the classroom teachers in 
their school. 
 
Class teacher views of effects of PM (all classroom teachers including those in the leadership 
group): 
 Made me more 
aware of school 
targets 
(meaware) 
Given me incentive to 
work beyond job 
requirements 
(mejobreq) 
Means good work 
now rewarded 
 
(Ppgdwork) 
Mgt set better 
targets 
 
(pptarget) 
Agree strongly .439 .268 .202 .194 
Agree .100 .160 .133 .108 
Disagree .046 .101 .107 .040 
Disagree strongly -.075 .104 .057 -.001 
     
Neutral/no view .214 .118 .088 .143 
Factor scores for better goal setting as judged by head teachers. Cells show factor scores for head teacher replies in 
these schools, waves 2 and 3 combined. Mean zero, standard deviation of unity. 
 
Class teacher views of effects of PM (excluding teachers in the leadership group): 
 Made me more 
aware of school 
targets 
(meaware) 
Given me incentive to 
work beyond job 
requirements 
(mejobreq) 
Means good work 
now rewarded 
 
(Ppgdwork) 
Mgt set better 
targets 
 
(pptarget) 
Agree strongly .427 .224 .238 .047 
Agree .094 .205 .130 .123 
Disagree .077 .097 .114 .012 
Disagree strongly -.047 .125 .070 .001 
     
Neutral/no view .226 .108 .097 .224 
 
Finally, we turn to the link between head teacher assessments of PM, and three other items relating 
to the effectiveness of PM in schools. When the new system was introduced, the government placed 
special emphasis on there being an element of pupil progress, and as the scheme was applied, the 
government also sought to make movement up the new Upper Pay Scale contingent on increasingly 
challenging performance standards. Both of these were strongly contested by the teachers’ unions, 
and it can be argued that their action led to a moderation of the government’s initial position on 
these issues. As mentioned earlier, there was some ambivalence among teachers as to whether the 
pupil progress element really had been reduced, and whether movement on the UPS has become 
less demanding. 
 
In Table 7 we compare teachers’ replies about these issues with those of their heads on PM and goal 
setting. What emerges is that in schools where PM is judged to improve goal setting, classroom 
teachers are more likely to report that the emphasis on pupil performance has been sustained. They 
were also more likely to be confident that all good teachers could hope to progress to the current top 
point on the upper pay scale. This again would be evidence that PM has functioned effectively in a 
good number of schools where teachers see their goals and the school’s goals to include pupil 
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progress, and where teachers are confident they can move up the performance-related upper pay 
scale. 
 
Table 7. Class teacher views of changes to PM 
 
Class teacher responses  (all classroom teachers) Yes No Neutral 
/no view 
Now less focus on pupil progress in PM .0484 .1819 .0623 
All good teachers can now reach UPS3 .1205 .089 .095 
School looks to education practices of schools higher up league 
tables .1259 .0360 .1505 
Cells: head teacher scores of whether PM aids goal setting in their school. All class teachers combined. 
 
The last element to be considered is the question of league tables. As mentioned at the start, these 
play a key part in the ‘quasi market’ in primary and secondary education where schools have to 
compete to attract pupils. Schools’ standing in the performance league tables is one important 
element in this because it communicates to parents how their children might be expected to 
perform. Do some schools look to those better placed in the league tables for ideas of new 
educational practices they could emulate? A notable feature of the classroom teacher responses on 
this is that they are more likely to report reference to the league tables if performance management 
is working well in their schools. 
 
5.3 How many schools have adopted the ‘reformer’ strategy? 
 
It would seem therefore that slowly growing number of schools have adopted the ‘reformer’, as 
compared with the ‘fire-fighter’ strategy. What is the share of such schools in the total population? 
 
The best criterion for judging whether a school has adopted the ‘reformer’ as opposed to the ‘fire-
fighter’ strategy is to gauge the degree to which goal setting is ‘joined-up’. In terms of the analysis 
so far, one might measure this by the degree to which positive assessments on improvements in goal 
setting by the head teachers, leadership group and classroom teachers in the same school 
correspond. If they all share the same view, then it is likely that there is an active dialogue about 
goals and how they can best be achieved within their school. The main problem with this measure is 
that it places great strain on the number of observations because schools will need to have a 
complete set of responses from their heads, members of the leadership group, and from non-leader 
classroom teachers. For this reason, the columns in Table 8 show various stages of this linked set of 
observations: linking a) heads and all classroom teachers; b) heads and the leadership group; c) the 
leadership group and non-leader class teachers; and d) linking all three groups. 
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Table 8. Percentage of schools with ‘joined-up’ goal setting: 
 
Schools  in which class teachers respond ‘agree’ given that both head teachers and the leadership 
group agree that PM has improved goal setting in their schools 
 PM has led to improved goal setting in my school 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 % agree % agree % agree % agree 
 Cross section analysis pooled across waves 
Waves 2 & 3 
using pooled 
responses 
28.7 26.5 26.0 15.6 
Schools with a 
complete  set of 
observations 
397 219 273 224 
 Panel analysis using wave-specific responses 
Wave 2 20.4% 27.2 14.3 8.2 
Wave 3 35.8% 38.5 26.8 20.3 
No complete  obs.  
wave 2 
206 81 70 85 
No complete sets 
of obs  wave 3 
137 65 82 74 
Notes:  
(a) heads and all classroom teachers 
(b) heads and leadership group 
(c) leadership group and non-leader class teachers 
(d) heads, leaders and non-leader class teachers 
The heads’ judgements on goal setting were based on the same index as that used in the previous tables, but 
taking the median value as dividing positive from negative judgements as to whether PM had improved goal 
setting. The leadership group values relate to those who agreed that PM had improved goal setting in their 
schools (themgoal), as did the class teacher question (pptarget). Members of the leadership group were 
identified from the biographical data obtained in the first wave.  
 
Although we had information from 424 schools for the balanced panel analysis, this yielded only 214 in 
wave 2 and 139 in wave 3 with information on the head’s assessment of improved goal setting. The numbers 
of schools with a complete set of observations dropped further when tabulating these replies against those of 
classroom and leadership group teacher. This will tend to eliminate smaller schools disproportionately. 
Results are unweighted and do not correct for over-sampling of secondary schools. (Program used: Reformer 
schools 19.7.05_1). 
 
On these crude estimates, roughly between 15% and 25% of schools in the sample can be 
characterised as possessing ‘joined up’ goal setting, between the different layers of school 
management (Table 8). This can be seen in the top row, which uses the largest number of 
observations available by pooling responses for 2001 and 2004. A similar analysis was carried out 
for the other indicator used in the earlier tables, namely, whether PM had increased one’s personal 
awareness of school targets. The effects were somewhat smaller, as shown in Table 1 above, as was 
the number of observations. These estimates are consistent with those of early case studies by 
Wragg et al (2001), and by Maloney et al. (2003), who found modest effects of the new system in 
changing how teachers perform. However, what these early studies could not capture is the growth 
in the number of schools in which goal setting is becoming ‘joined-up’. Even though the small 
numbers of effective observations beckons caution, whichever measure is used, there has been an 
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increase of about ten percentage points in such schools: from 10-20% in 2001 to 20-30% in 2004. 
The growth in the numbers of ‘reformer’ schools was confirmed by computing a transition matrix 
between such schools in 2001 and 2004, which showed strong movement from ‘non-reformer’ 
schools in 2001 into the ‘reformer’ category in 2004, with only small number of moves in the 
opposite direction. Thus, one can say that the number of schools adopting the ‘reformer’ strategy 
has increased quite strongly since the inception of the new system. 
 
5.4 School performance 
 
Finally, we turn to effects on performance management on school performance as reflected in the 
government’s league table performance indicators. To gauge these we take changes in the academic 
results of schools at Key Stage 2 for primary schools, and for GCSE (aged 15) for secondary 
schools (Table 9). We identify those schools which improved their relative academic performance 
as reflected in the results for school years ending 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, and compare this 
group with those reporting an improvement in goal setting between waves 2 and 3. The sample 
numbers of those changing between waves 2 and 3 are quite small, so the results can be only 
tentative, but we found a positive and statistically significant relationship: schools whose heads 
report improvements in goal setting were more likely also to have improved their academic results 
(with a chi squared value of 3.1 significant at the 10% level, based on 169 schools). 
 
Table 9. Goal setting and school performance 
 
(Column %) Improved relative academic 
performance at school 
Improved use of goal 
setting in school No Yes 
No 53 40 
Yes 47 60 
   
 Chi^2 3.1 
 P 0.079 
 Notes: Table shows changes between waves 2 & 3. 
  Goal-setting score computed by factor analysis 
 
Confidence in these findings is boosted by similar findings from researchers at the CMPO, Bristol 
University, using a completely different methodology, which show a positive effect of threshold 
assessment on the academic performance of pupils in classes taught by eligible teachers (Atkinson 
et al, 2004). The CMPO study examines the change in academic achievements of pupils in classes 
taught by teachers who were, or were not, eligible to pass the Threshold. They found that pupils 
with teachers eligible to pass the Threshold were more likely to improve their performance. 
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Although the CMPO study emphasises the financial incentive of passing the threshold, their 
evidence is consistent with that this paper. Their statistical results could equally well derive from 
improved goal setting as opposed to simple financial incentive. Although the findings of our own 
study suggest that teachers do not attribute much motivational effect to the financial incentives 
offered, it is clear that being eligible for the threshold, would make teachers more amenable to 
focusing on the goals agreed with their head teachers. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications for Practice 
 
Like other groups of public services covered by performance pay and performance management, it 
would seem that most teachers believe the financial inducements to improve their performance are 
ineffective. This is so despite the large cumulative pay increase that could be obtained over several 
years. In terms of pay levels before implementation, the new UPS opened the prospect of up to 25% 
increased pay for sustained high performance over several years, carrying such teachers well above 
average non-manual pay. Moreover, the pay increase would be permanent and pensionable unlike 
performance bonuses in some organisations.  
 
In contrast, the new system appears to be having a greater impact on the goal setting and appraisal. 
Although there was fairly pervasive scepticism among teachers at the start about all aspects of the 
new scheme, it is in this area that the most striking changes have occurred. There has been declining 
scepticism about the measurability of teachers’ performance, and a growing confidence in the 
clarity of target setting and in the fairness of their line managers. The opinion of head teachers has 
also changed markedly during the lifetime of the scheme, displaying increased confidence in the 
quality and utility of goal setting. 
 
Successful implementation of performance management in schools may best be judged by the 
degree of concordance between the views of head teachers, the leadership group, whose members 
play a central part in performance management, and classroom teachers. During the lifetime of the 
scheme, there has been a clear growth in positive judgements, and the degree of alignment between 
the views of these three groups suggests performance management is taking root in schools. 
Moreover, the responses concerning different aspects of goal setting, and the increased awareness 
of school objectives, suggest that it is more than a mere paper exercise. This in itself is interesting 
given the failure of the attempt to introduce performance appraisal in schools in the early 1990s 
(Ofsted, 1996). 
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Behind the general picture, it appears that schools have operated different strategies, which we 
denoted as the ‘fire-fighter’ and the ‘reformer’ strategies. In the latter case, schools have sought to 
take advantage of the new system in order to change the way they are managed, and to develop 
more systematic means of knitting together the objectives of individual classroom teachers and 
those of their schools. All schools are obliged to hold performance reviews, and they are also 
obliged to have development or improvement plans, but it requires a positive decision to coordinate 
these, and join up both sets of objectives. 
 
Our continuing research will explore the set of factors that determine whether a school will adopt 
one strategy or the other. First indications from this study suggest that the proportion of schools 
following the ‘reformer’ strategy may be as many as one school in five, with signs that this 
proportion is increasing, especially when one considers the improvements in goal setting reflected 
in the overall sample. Where head teachers report improved goal setting, it appears that classroom 
teachers notice a stronger focus on pupil progress within PM, and they also notice greater reference 
to relative school performance in league tables. Whether this materialises in better pupil results in 
league table indicators is the subject of our on-going work, and the jury is still out, but first results 
shown here indicate a positive effect. 
 
This study, like the others on public service performance pay and performance management, 
underlines the importance of PM as a means of agreeing objectives and linking them with wider 
organisational objectives, and confirms the limited responsiveness of public employees to financial 
incentives to increase or vary aspects of their performance. Nevertheless pay is still relevant. As 
noted earlier, young teachers did express the view that the improved long-term earnings 
opportunities made teaching more attractive. In addition, compared with the abandoned appraisal 
scheme of the 1990s, which was divorced from pay, the present system of PM may well be taken 
more seriously by both heads and class teachers because of the link with pay. 
                                                 
1 According to the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), about 250,000 teachers were eligible for the Threshold. 
About 201,000 (80 per cent) teachers applied. About 97 per cent of those who applied met the Threshold standards and 
passed onto UPS point 1, a rate that was sustained in the years immediately following (DfES 2001, Annex A, Appendix 
B; DfES 2004, para. 3). 
 
2 We are indebted to Mike Chapman, former head of Cambridge Educational Associates, for first drawing our attention 
to the different ways in which schools were approaching the new system. The CEA was in charge of the system of 
schools’ external advisors for the first wave of threshold assessments. 
 
3  Nevertheless, results of the first wave, reported in Marsden (2001), did suggest that new entrants are sensitive to the 
improved earnings prospects associated with the new pay scale, so there could be performance benefits from improved 
retention, even if the financial incentives have little positive effect on motivation. 
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8. Appendix 1: Alternative Estimates for Figures in Tables 5, 6 and 7 
 
In Table 5, the figures report the views of those who responded to the section of the questionnaire for those 
in the leadership group, including team leaders. Because it is possible that some classroom teachers may also 
have completed this section of the questionnaire by mistake, the analysis was repeated for those who 
declared themselves in the first wave, in 2000, to be members of the leadership group. Using this narrower 
definition makes little difference to the results shown in Table 5 in the main text. 
 
Table 5A. Leadership group only 
 
Leadership group 
response (excl head): 
Makes class teachers more 
aware of school targets 
(themgoal) 
Promotes better work 
priorities among class 
teachers (thempriors) 
increases importance of 
good middle-mgt 
(themmidl) 
Agree strongly .365 .242 .218 
Agree .037 .128 .205 
Disagree .177 .205 .110 
Disagree strongly -.435 -.508 -.390 
    
Neutral/no view .188 .001 .013 
Note: in wave 1, teachers were asked to state whether they were members of the ‘leadership group’. In the 
above sample, there were 961 out of 2820 in the leadership group. 
 
A similar analysis was repeated for the classroom teacher analysis in Table 6 because of the possibility that 
sustantial numbers of classroom teachers in 2000 many have been promoted by 2004. The relationship 
shown in Table 6A is somewhat weaker than that in the main text using the narrower definition of the 
leadership group, but it should be added that the sample numbers are considerably smaller. 
 
Table 6A. Class teacher views of effects of PM (excluding teachers responding to the leadership questions, 
leadership group and team leaders) 
 
 Made me more 
aware of school 
targets 
(meaware) 
Given me incentive to 
work beyond job 
requirements 
(mejobreq) 
Means good work 
now rewarded 
 
(Ppgdwork) 
Mgt set better 
targets 
 
(pptarget) 
Agree strongly .242 .207 .239 -.138 
Agree .001 .142 .141 .051 
Disagree .036 .095 .092 .044 
Disagree strongly -.007 .102 .066 .011 
     
Neutral/no view .229 .145 .073 .169 
 
Table 7A shows similar calculations for table 7 in the main text, this time, excluding classroom teachers in 
the leadership group. 
 
Table 7A. Class teacher views of changes to PM 
 
Class teacher responses  (excluding leadership group) Yes No Neutral 
/no view 
Now less focus on pupil progress in PM .0189 .1748 .0934 
All good teachers can now reach UPS3 .1228 .1221 .0643 
School looks to education practices of schools higher up league 
tables .1015 .1003 .1154 
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9. Appendix 2: Sample Design and Questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire was developed in close consultation with the teachers’ unions and the 
Department for Education and Skills, and piloted on groups of lay representatives. For the first 
wave, a random sample of 1,675 schools was drawn from the Register of Educational 
Establishments for England and a similar register for Wales, and packages of questionnaires were 
sent to head teachers. Heads received a covering letter explaining the nature of the study, that it had 
the support of the head teachers’ associations, and that it had been developed in consultation with 
the teachers’ unions and the DfEE. They were asked to distribute the questionnaires. In small 
schools with under 35 teachers, every teacher was sent a questionnaire, and in larger ones, heads 
were asked to select every nth teacher off the school’s staff list depending on the size of the school. 
Heads were asked to complete a special questionnaire. Being a panel study, the initial respondents 
to wave one were approached again for waves two and three. 
 
The overall response rate to the first wave was about 20%, which comprises a double response: 
whether the head teacher agreed to distribute the questionnaires in the first place, and then whether 
the teachers themselves chose to reply. In many schools, head teachers have a policy of not 
distributing questionnaires in their schools in order not to add to the workload on their teachers. 
 
Initially, the panel included replies from about 4,000 teachers and about 1,000 heads. Accounting 
for sample attrition, it is possible to link replies from about 1,000 teachers and about 300 heads over 
time through the panel. We conducted a number of checks to see whether the panel results reported 
here differ statistically significantly from the simple cross-section results for each wave, and found 
that on the whole they do not. 
 
The questionnaire used for classroom teachers and for head teachers in Wave 3 is given below. That 
for Wave 1 can be found in Marsden (2000).
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LSE Study of Performance Management for Teachers 
Questionnaire for classroom teachers 
1. Have you passed the Threshold or had pay progression on the Upper pay Scale? 
(Please circle the appropriate answer) Yes No Don’t know 
1 Have you already passed the Threshold? 1 2 0 
2 Have you already had pay progression on the Upper Pay Scale? 1 2 0 
3 Have you had a Performance Review in the past 12 months? 1 2 0 
2. Please tell me your views about different aspects of the post-2000 teachers’ pay system. 
Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the answer closest to your opinion. 
a) The Threshold                                  (please circle) Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
4 The higher levels of pay above the Threshold mean that good 
teaching is rewarded at last. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
5 The salary levels above the Threshold are too low to make me 
want to work harder in order to get them. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
6 The Threshold has caused resentment among teachers who feel 
they already meet the standards but are not eligible to apply. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
7 The higher pay levels above the Threshold make it more 
attractive for me to remain a teacher. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
8 Introducing the Threshold has had no effect on the quality of 
my work because it is already at the appropriate standard. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
b) The Upper Pay Scale: Linking pay with the Performance Review (appraisal/objective setting) 
9 Linking pay with the Performance Review results in a fairer 
allocation of pay. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
10 The link undermines my confidence in the Review. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
11 The link makes me take the Review more seriously. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
12 The link is problematic because it is hard to relate the work 
done in schools to individual performance. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
13 The link has little effect because, in practice, all eligible 
teachers benefit irrespective of individual performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 0 
14 Managers use Performance Review to reward their favourites. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
15 An appeals procedure is needed to ensure that progression on 
the Upper Pay Scale is operated fairly. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
16 Many good teachers will not progress up the Upper Pay Scale 
because of limits on the funding available. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
c) Considering the new pay system as a whole: Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
17 The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a 
good one. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
18 The principle that individual teachers’ pay should take some 
account of pupil progress is a good one. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
19 The new pay system is designed to raise pupil achievements. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
20 For all that is said about pupil attainments, the new pay system 
is simply a device to get more work done. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
3. I should like to ask you about your most recent Performance Review: 
 (Please circle the appropriate answer) Yes No Don’t know 
21 Did the meeting establish specific objectives for the coming year? 1 2 0 
22 Were they clear and measurable? 1 2 0 
23 Were they focused on issues/matters over which you have direct control? 1 2 0 
24 Did they relate to wider objectives in the school, eg, as in the School 
Development Plan or department or team plans? 
1 2 0 
25 Did they take account of your professional needs? 1 2 0 
26 Did they include indicators of pupil progress? 1 2 0 
From the objectives set in your most recent Performance Review:    
27 Are you in a position to achieve them? 1 2 0 
28 Do you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed? 1 2 0 
29 Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your team leader? 1 2 0 
 25
30 Could you influence which objectives were chosen? 1 2 0 
4. If you have applied for the Threshold in the past two years:  
(Please circle the appropriate answer) Yes No Don’t know 
31 Did you receive feedback from your head teacher when you were informed 
of the result? 
1 2 0 
32 Did the feedback give clear reasons for the result? 1 2 0 
5. If you have been considered for UPS pay progression during the past two years:  
(Please circle the appropriate answer) Yes No Don’t know 
33 Did you receive feedback from your head teacher when you were informed 
of the result? 
1 2 0 
If yes, did this feedback:    
34 give clear reasons for the result? 1 2 0 
35 help you identify areas for your further professional development? 1 2 0 
36 refer to evidence that you have met the objectives agreed in your 
Performance Review? 
1 2 0 
37 refer to evidence based on classroom observation (if applicable) 1 2 0 
 
In your school, would you say the Threshold and UPS have been: Yes No Don’t know 
38 used mainly as a way to ensure teachers get their pay increase? 1 2 0 
39 used to make staff better informed about objectives within the school? 1 2 0 
40 used to help better identify teachers’ professional development needs? 1 2 0 
41 the cause of divisions between management and staff? 1 2 0 
6. Please tell me how Performance Management has affected your own work: 
(Please circle the appropriate answer) Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
42 Performance Management has made me more aware of the 
targets set in the School Improvement Plan. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
43 PM has reduced my wish to co-operate with management 1 2 3 4 5 0 
44 PM has made me want to show more initiative in my job 1 2 3 4 5 0 
45 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if the school 
can afford to reward me with a pay rise. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
46 PM has made team leaders and managers set work targets more 
clearly 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
47 My performance is always well above that of other teachers in 
my school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
48 Managers/team leaders in my school know enough about the 
work of their staff to identify poor performance 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
49 Linking pay with performance will give me more incentive to 
work beyond the requirements of my job 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
7. Does you school use any of the following methods to try to produce better academic 
performance in the school? 
 (Please circle) Yes No Not sure 
50 Learning about educational practices used at comparable schools scoring 
strongly in school ‘league tables’? 
1 2 0 
51 Discussing ways to improve your school’s academic performance at group or 
dept. meetings within your school? 
1 2 0 
52 Establishing goals/targets for your school’s performance improvements? 1 2 0 
8. Please tell me about your work hours and activities outside directed (formal school) hours: 
in the evenings, before the school day, and at weekends. 
53 Last week, approximately how many hours did you spend working outside directed 
hours in the evenings, before the school day, and at the weekend? 
 
No. of hours. 
54 If this was NOT a typical term-time week, did you work: 
a) more hours than usual? 
     b) less hours than usual?.. 
 
1 
2 
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55 During the last two school weeks (excluding half term), roughly how many hours per week have you spent on 
each of the following activities outside directed hours in the evenings, before the school day, and at weekends?  
 Please give the 
number of hours 
per week to the 
nearest half hour 
Most important reason 
(See key in Q 56 below: 
please enter the appropriate 
number in the col. below) 
a) Lesson preparation and marking (including report writing, 
pupil records etc.) 
  
b) Seeing parents and pupils outside class time (e.g. for additional 
help with work, guidance) 
  
c) Involvement in school clubs, sports, orchestras, etc. 
 
  
d) School/staff management: meetings, management activities etc. 
(including appraising staff and PM) 
  
e) General administrative tasks (e.g. organising resources, general 
record keeping, photocopying) 
  
f) Individual & professional development activities (e.g. 
professional reading, courses, conferences, and being trained or 
being appraised) 
  
 
56 Most important reason for undertaking the above activities outside directed hours. Below are some 
common reasons why teachers work such hours. Please would you indicate the most important reason in the 
right hand column of Question 55 above, giving its number 1- 9. 
 
1)  I felt it necessary because I wanted to get the work done 
2)  I felt under pressure to do so from management 
3)  I felt it necessary because it is the only way to continue to give a high quality of education to my pupils 
4)  I have taken on extra responsibilities because I need the money 
5)  I really quite enjoy the work 
6)  I do it for the benefit of my school 
7)  I don’t want to let my colleagues or my pupils down 
8)  The activities concerned are only available outside formal school hours 
9)  Some other reason (please specify in writing)……………………………………………………………………. 
 
9. Please tell me about your general feelings and views about your school: 
 Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
57 I feel quite proud to be able to tell people that I work at my 
current school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
58 I feel myself to be a part of my current school 1 2 3 4 5 0 
59 To know that my own work had made a contribution to the 
good of my school would please me 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
60 In my work, I like to feel that I am making an effort not just for 
myself but for my school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
61 Even if my school were in serious financial difficulty, I would 
be reluctant to change to another school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
62 The offer of a bit more money at another school would not 
seriously make me think of changing school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
63 I can always get a similar job in another school if I want to 1 2 3 4 5 0 
10. Which groups do you identify as sharing the same interests as you in connection with 
Performance Management?  
When considering the implementation of PM, which groups do you 
feel share broadly the same interests as yourself? (Please circle) 
Broadly the 
same 
Mostly 
different 
It’s hard to 
say 
64 Your school’s governors 1 2 0 
65 The leadership group/management team in your school 1 2 0 
66 Other teachers in your school 1 2 0 
67 Other teachers in your union or professional association 1 2 0 
68 Your union or professional association 1 2 0 
69 Your LEA 1 2 0 
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70 The DfES 1 2 0 
11. It is said that some important changes have been made to the operation of Performance 
Management in schools since its introduction in 2000. I should like you to consider two such changes, 
and let me know who you believe was responsible. 
 Disagree Neutral Agree Don’t 
know 
71 Now most good teachers can expect to progress to UPS 3 on 
the Upper Pay Scale. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0 
 
72 If you agree: Whose action do you consider brought this change about? (Please circle)  
 Most important Second most 
important 
1. The DfES 
2. Your LEA 
3. The teachers’ unions 
4. Individual head teachers voicing their concern 
5. |Individual teachers voicing their concern 
6. All of these groups are equally responsible 
7. None of the above 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
 
 Disagree Neutral Agree Don’t 
know 
73 The ‘pupil progress’ element in teachers’ performance is now 
less prominent, and treated more broadly, in Performance 
Management than originally proposed by the DfES. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0 
 
74 If you agree: Whose action do you consider brought this change about? (Please circle)  
 Most important Second most 
important 
1. The DfES 
2. Your LEA 
3. The teachers’ unions 
4. Individual head teachers voicing their concern 
5. |Individual teachers voicing their concern 
6. All of these groups are equally responsible 
7. None of the above 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
12. Additional questions for Team Leaders. 
If you are a Team Leader, I should like to ask some further questions. Thinking of those you in your team, 
what is your opinion of the following: 
 Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
75 Performance management has made more teachers aware of 
the school’s objectives in the School Improvement Plan 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
76 Performance management has caused many teachers to 
increase the quantity of work they do 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
77 Performance management has made many teachers less willing 
to cooperate with management in the school 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
78 Performance management has caused teachers to think more 
systematically about their work priorities 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
79 Performance management has increased the importance of 
middle management in my school. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire. Please return it directly to me, Professor David 
Marsden at the LSE, using the pre-paid envelope enclosed. 
 
If you would like to take part in a follow-up telephone interview, please give your number and a 
convenient time to call: tel:     convenient time: 
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If you wish to add any other comments on the post-2000 teachers’ pay system, please add them here or on 
the back of the cover letter.  
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LSE Study of Performance Management for Teachers 
Questionnaire for Head Teachers 
1. Your views about the working of the post-2000 teachers’ pay system in your school 
Please say whether you think certain elements of the post-2000 teachers’ pay system for teachers 
will assist you with the management of your school. 
 
(Please circle the answer that most closely reflects your view). Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
The Threshold and Upper Pay Scale       
1 The higher pay levels above the Threshold mean that good 
teaching can be rewarded at last. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
2 The Threshold has caused resentment among teachers who feel 
they already meet the standards but are not eligible to apply. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
3 Linking pay above the Threshold with the Performance Review 
results in a fairer allocation of pay. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
Performance Review: (Objective setting/appraisal meetings)       
4 The meetings help focus teachers’ efforts on the objectives in 
the School Improvement Plan. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
5 Linking pay above the Threshold with the Performance Review 
makes everyone take appraisal more seriously. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
6 The meetings assist the leadership group in dealing with poor 
performance. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
c) The new pay system’s linking of pay to performance as a 
whole (Threshold and Upper Pay Scale): 
      
7 The link can do little to raise performance because teachers 
already work as hard as they possibly can. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
8 The link  gives teachers greater incentive to focus on pupil 
attainments. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
9 The link  is problematic because it is hard to relate the work 
done in schools to individual performance. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
10 The link is unfair because too few teachers have enough 
autonomy in their jobs to change their ways. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
11 The link has little effect because, in practice, all eligible 
teachers move up the UPS regardless of individual performanc 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
 
d) Considering the new pay system as a whole: Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
12 The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a 
good one. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
13 The principle that individual teachers’ pay should take some 
account of pupil progress is a good one. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
14 The new pay system is designed to raise pupil achievements. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
15 For all that is said about pupil attainments, the new pay system 
is simply a device to get more work done. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
16 It is better to reward the achievements of the whole school than 
the performance of individual teachers. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
2. Conduct of Threshold assessments and Upper Pay Scale progression 
Please tell me something about the measures in your school for dealing with these issues. 
(Please circle the appropriate answer) 
a) the Threshold 
Yes No Don’t 
know 
17 Was there someone in the school available to advise or ‘mentor’ 
applications? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
18 Were teachers given feedback when they were informed of the result? 1 2 0 
b) Upper Pay Scale progression:    
19 Is there a procedure in your school for teachers to apply for UPS 
progression? 
1 2 0 
20 Were teachers given feedback when they were informed of the result? 1 2 0 
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Would you say the Threshold and UPS process helped the 
management in your school to: 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
21 Ensure teachers in my school get their pay increase? 1 2 3 4 5 0 
22 Make staff better informed about objectives within the school? 1 2 3 4 5 0 
23 Provide an opportunity to discuss the school’s PANDA, and its 
School Development Plan with staff? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
24 Identify better individual teachers’ professional development 
needs? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
25 They have caused divisions between management and staff. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
3. Performance Reviews in your school (including objective setting/appraisal 
meetings)  
 (Please circle the appropriate answer) Yes No Don’t know 
26 Does your school have a Performance Review for its teachers? 1 2 0 
27 Does your school have a written pay policy for teachers? 1 2 0 
 
 
If you have already held objective setting or appraisal 
meetings, how have they helped you to manage your school: 
Not at 
all 
No Neutral Yes Yes, 
definitely 
Don’t 
know 
28 Did the meetings help establish specific objectives for 
teachers for the coming year? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
29 Did most of the teachers in your school approach their 
objective setting meetings positively? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
30 Did the meetings help relate teachers’ objectives to wider 
objectives in the school, e.g., as in the School Improvement 
Plan or department or team plans? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
31 Did the meetings provide a good opportunity to discuss 
individual teachers’ professional needs? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
32 Did they provide an opportunity to discuss how to sustain or 
improve pupil progress? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
4. Effects of Performance Management (PM) on teachers’ performance in your 
school 
 Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
33 Performance management has made more teachers aware of 
the school’s objectives in the School Improvement Plan. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
34 PM has caused many teachers to increase the quantity of work 
they do. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
35 PM has made many teachers less willing to cooperate with 
management in the school. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
36 PM has caused teachers to think more systematically about 
their work priorities. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
37 PM has increased the importance of good middle management 
in my school. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
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In the previous surveys, about 45% of head teachers thought there was significant variation in 
teaching effectiveness among experienced teachers in their schools. In your experience so far, are 
there any ways in which the combined effects of the Threshold and Performance Reviews help 
reduce the variation? 
 
PM has helped the school assist those teachers: Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
38 whose professional development needs are greatest. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
39 whose morale was low 1 2 3 4 5 0 
40 who had difficulty motivating their pupils. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
41 with difficult or inappropriate workloads. 1 2 3 4 5 0 
42 Are there any other ways it may have helped in your school? 
(Please write any comment in box to right) 
 
5. Do you use any of the following methods to try to produce better academic 
performance in your school? 
 (Please circle) Yes No Not sure 
43 Learning about educational practices used at comparable schools scoring 
strongly in school ‘league tables’? 
1 2 0 
44 Discussing ways to improve your school’s academic performance at group or 
dept. meetings within your school? 
1 2 0 
45 Establishing goals/targets for your school’s performance improvements? 1 2 0 
6. Which of the following effects, if any, would you say that ‘league tables’ in 
education have had on your school? 
(Please circle) Yes No Not 
sure 
46 More resources provided in subjects (such as maths) covered in the tests, at the expense of 
other subjects or areas 
1 2 0 
47 Significant resources devoted to teaching students test-taking skills for the school tests, as 
opposed to teaching about the content of the subject matter in the tests. 
1 2 0 
48 Stronger motivation for teachers in general in your school to help the school perform 
strongly academically 
1 2 0 
49 Stronger motivation for the weaker teachers in your school to help their students perform 
strongly academically 
1 2 0 
50 Stronger motivation by most students in your school to perform well academically 1 2 0 
51 More academic content  in courses covered by tests, as opposed to other possible 
classroom content 
1 2 0 
52 More pressure from parents on the school to perform well academically 1 2 0 
53 More pressure by parents on their children to perform well academically 1 2 0 
54 More tension in the classroom 1 2 0 
7. Finally, some general questions about the teachers in your school 
(Please circle) Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
55 The experienced classroom teachers in my school generally 
have the same level of teaching skills 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
56 For a given starting attainment, the increase in pupil attainment 
depends largely on the effectiveness of individual teachers 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
57 The current workloads of teachers in my school prevent them 
from raising their pupils’ attainments as much as they could 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
58 Teachers in my school enjoy a lot of autonomy to try out new 
ideas in the classroom 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
0 
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Compared with all the teachers you have encountered in your professional 
life in teaching, would you say that the majority of teachers in your school 
are in: 
(please circle) 
59 * The upper third of teacher morale? 
 * The middle third 
 * The lower third 
1 
2 
3 
60 * The upper third of teaching skills? 
 * The middle third 
 * The lower third 
1 
2 
3 
61 * The upper third in terms of how hard they work? 
 * The middle third 
 * The lower third 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
62 Which is the strongest of the teachers’ unions in your school? 1. ATL 
2. NASUWT 
3. NUT 
4. PAT/PAN 
5. UCAC 
6. Other 
 
Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire. Please return it directly to me, Professor 
David Marsden at the LSE, using the pre-paid envelope enclosed. 
 
If you would like to take part in a follow-up telephone interview, please give your number and a 
convenient time to call: tel:     convenient time: 
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